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Definitions
These notes have their starting-point in two parallel discussions.1
The first is political: there is broad discussion about possible models
to solve the issue of ”orphan works” in digital library programmes.
Some proposals refer to the Extended Collective Licenses (ECL)2
1The author works for the Italian Publishers Association (AIE) and is the coor-
dinator of the Arrow project (http://www.arrow-net.eu). However, the opinions
expressed in this paper reflect only the personal view of the author and cannot be
read, in any circumstances, as AIE or Arrow positions.
2Riis and Schovsbo (“Extended Collective Licenses and the Nordic Experience. It’s
a Hybrid but is it a Volvo or a Lemon?”) describe the terms of this debate in Europe
and in other countries, with particular reference to Canada. In some key documents
on copyright matters recently approved by the European Commission there is explicit
mention to this option (Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy. COM(2008)
466;Communication on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy. COM(2009) 532, final 5). At
member state level, cf. in particular UK Intellectual Property Office ( c©the way ahead:
A Strategy for Copyright in the Digital Age;“The Nordic Model: Extended Collective
Licenses and Its Relation to International Instruments”).
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as a possible solution, others envisage systems with other types of
Voluntary Stakeholders Agreements (VSA).3
The second concerns the relationship between the implemen-
tation of any system based on voluntary agreements and rights
information management, with particular reference to "registries"4
and, more generally, to infrastructure to manage rights information
for the purpose of digital library programmes. Such infrastructure
has been called Rights Information Infrastructure (RII).
Terms like VSA and RII are relatively new in the debate about
rights management, so it is worth starting with definitions.
Definition of VSA
I use the term VSA to extend a concept that is historically linked
to the Extended collective license model that has been in place in a
number of Northern European countries for decades. ECL systems
are rooted in that legal and social environment. When proposed as a
model for other countries, the problem is to distinguish the abstract
3The concept of VSA is similar but not coincident with ”Models based on con-
tractual agreements between stakeholders” as described in Van Gompel (“Unlocking
the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How to Address the Issue of Orphan Works
in Europe?”).”Contractual agreements” include, in Van Gompel classification, also
”mandatory exercise of rights”, whilst the emphasis is here on ”voluntary” mechanism.
However, if a mandatory contractual agreement also allows individual rightholders
to opt out, the boundaries between the two categories may be thin from an economic
viewpoint.
4Varian (“Copyright term extension and orphan works”) suggests the creation of
”a centralised copyright registry” as a tool to facilitate diligent search, to approach
the issues of transaction costs and orphan works. See also Mara (“High Copyright
Transaction Costs Cause ’Friction’, Google Economist Tells WIPO”) who reports the
content of a Varian’s intervention at the WIPO: ”The best solution to the problem
of transaction costs caused by intellectual property with regards to orphan works is
a clearinghouse that would not only contain a registry of potential rights holders, but
would also indicate prices different sellers might ask for the licence on their work”
(emphasis added).
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characteristics that can provide value in different contexts from the
elements that are linked to the specific historic experience and hence
difficult to replicate.5 For these reasons, I propose to be careful with
the terminology and to call VSA the abstract model resulting from
this analysis. So, I call VSA any type of system, including ECL,
featuring the following three characteristics:
• rightholders’ associations and/or a Collective Management
Organisation (CMO) freely negotiate with users the terms of a
license for the particular uses of works they represent. Repre-
sentation must be actual and genuine for the works in ques-
tion;6
• a CMO is entitled7 to issue such a license to individual users;
• the legal system extends the validity of the signed agreement
to cover the works of non-mandating rightholders (i) holding
rights in the same categories of works (ii) for the same type
of use (iii) in the sector for which the agreement has been
signed. This is crucial to guarantee the user’s legal position,
since a contractual solution without such extension can tackle
the financial liability but not the criminal liability associated
to unauthorised use (Koskinen-Olsson 292).
5”ECLs have been successful because of the context in which they function. If
one, therefore, would seek to transplant these models one should be very careful
to include into the design of the systems not just the rules themselves but also the
broader background” (Riis and Schovsbo).
6The concrete way to assess if a particular CMO or rightholder association is
representative is not relevant here. Instead, the relevant point is that the CMO is
accepted as representative by the relevant stakeholders. Cases of gaps between the
official procedures to assess the CMO as representative and the actual perception of
relevant stakeholders are not treated here.
7Using the word ”entitled” implies a reference to the existence of an authority that
authorises the CMO and a procedure to obtain this. For the limited purpose of this
paper, the concrete form of such entitlement is not relevant.
239
P. Attanasio, Rights Information Infrastructures
Additional features of VSAs are logical consequences of the char-
acteristics above:
• mandating and non-mandating rightholders shall be treated
equally with respect to licensing conditions and distribution of
collected fees. Non-mandating rightholders can always claim
for their share of remuneration;
• there should be the possibility for a rightholder to opt out,
withdrawing totally or in parts his/her works, and licensing
the use of the works directly him/herself.8
In this view, VSA is seen as different from other collective man-
agement schemes. It is different from a mere voluntary licensing
because of the extension of the license so as to cover non-mandating
rightholders. It is different from legal licenses because the terms
and conditions of the licenses are freely negotiated by the parties,
while in the statutory license they are (at least in part) pre-defined
by the law. One can argue that this last is not too different when
the terms of a legal licence are defined after a stakeholders’ con-
sultation and there is an opt-out mechanism (see the French case
below). Furthermore, in many compulsory license systems some
terms of the licenses (starting from tariffs) are subject to negotiation
between the parties, so the boundaries between the two systems are
not completely clear. At the abstract level that I would like to main-
tain in this paper, the distinction is that in a VSA all (or most) terms
of the license are decided by stakeholders, over the time, through
negotiation, while in statutory license, significant part of those terms
8This feature is not always present in the current ECL in place, but I consider it
as an element of the VSA, since it is necessary to make ”voluntary” the mechanism.
Furthermore, it makes the model more flexible and thus more acceptable in new
contexts.
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are defined by the law.9 Thus, in theory, it is possible that an actual
legal license system is so flexible that it can fall in the proposed
VSA definition, and it is also possible that a voluntary system is de-
fined within such a strict legal constrain that cannot be defined as a
VSA.10 Within my definition of VSA, the level of flexibility provided
by a mechanism of extension of a voluntary stakeholders agreement
is higher than in legal licenses, which require modification of the
law to change their terms. In my personal view, mandatory terms
of licenses are preferable only if the context of the exploitation of
the works is stable over time, and/or if it is important to include
any social objective that goes beyond the interest of stakeholders
represented in the negotiation. As a matter of fact, the legal tradi-
tion – which is an important element at least from a psychological
viewpoint – may also influence the decision, making the compul-
sory licenses model more acceptable by stakeholders themselves.
The main characteristics of VSA that I would like to emphasise are
”consensus” (there should be an agreement that is then extended) and
”representation” (whenever the CMO or rightholders associations are
not representative of the affected works/rightholders, the system
cannot be defined as a VSA).
9For example, the Italian compulsory license for reprographic rights (Art. 68 of
the copyright law) leaves large field to negotiation between rightholders and users
associations, mediated by the appointed CMO. However, the fundamental terms of
the license are defined by the law: licenses can be issued only for photocopies, up to
15% of each book or periodical issue, and for ”personal use” only. So the creation of
course-packs or any digital right etc. cannot be included in the negotiation without
changing the law.
10Koskinen-Olsson (293) describes the different models in comparison with the
ECL system, identifying a broader range of alternatives. I am using the extremes of
the range for explanatory reasons: as Koskinen-Olsson explains, some ”compulsory
collective license” models, where the only obligation is the collective management,
not the terms of the license, are very similar to ECLs, and thus might be included in
the VSA definition.
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Cases that Fall Under the Definition of VSA
Looking at these three core characteristics, I argue that existing
ECL systems are usually VSAs, but also that VSAs cover additional
cases. Interestingly enough, the Google Settlement has been com-
pared to an ECL license.11 From a legal viewpoint, this comparison
may be incorrect, but I am interested here in emphasising that some
key characteristics are the same. Rightholders’ representative organ-
isations (the Association of American Publishers and the Authors’
Guild) negotiated terms and conditions of a complex license with a
large user, and proposed to extend this license to a broader commu-
nity of rightholders.12 Significantly, many objectors to the agreement
emphasised the lack of consensus and the lack of representation of
foreign rightholders as key elements that made the settlement unac-
ceptable. The Department of Justice of the US also pointed out this
problem and, in the second version of the Settlement, the scope was
dramatically reduced to take this objection into account.13
Recently, in Germany, the national library and rightholder rep-
resentatives agreed on a solution for digitisation programmes in-
cluding in-copyright works. In order to avoid a situation in which
such programmes compete with the normal exploitation of works,
the parties have agreed to allow the inclusion of in-copyright books
11Tilman Lüder proposed this comparison during the Seminar on copyright
and digital libraries organised by the Spanish Presidency of the European Union
in Madrid, February 2010. An extended comparison has been proposed by
Skarstein (“The bookshelf.no : A matter of Intellectual Property Right”). See also
Lang (Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An International Perspective,
INRIA & AFUL).
12Since ECLs are not present in the US legislation, they tried to obtain the same
effect through the class action procedure. The legal terms of this attempt have been
subjected to strong opposition. Here I am interested only in the economic rationale,
which seems to me very similar in the two cases.
13There are still issues in this respect, and the case has not reached its conclusion
as I write these notes. However, this is not important here.
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within the digital library programme only under certain conditions:
the works must be out of print;14 they must have been published
before a certain cut-off date; the requests must come from particular
categories of libraries. Under these conditions, obtaining authori-
sation from individual rightholders on a title-by-title basis is not
necessary, though rightholders can withdraw their works from the
agreement at any time. This agreement is based on a modification
of the mandate of the CMO. The procedure for this modification
contains an opt-out possibility for registered rightholders within
a certain time-frame. Once the modification is implemented, any
rightholder may withdraw individual titles from the scheme at any
time. Extension of this agreement to non-mandating rightholders by
way of legislation is a possibility for the future, still under discussion.
If such extension becomes a reality, the case will fall under the VSA
definition, because it has the three key characteristics: free negotia-
tion, consensus and representation, and extension to non-mandating
rightholders of the effects of the agreement.
What an RII Is
Arrow is a European project that is developing a system to manage
rights information for the purposes of any digital library programme
and, in principle, for any other use. In particular, it is conceived
to facilitate diligent search to identify the rights status of any work
that a library wishes to digitise and make available online. Rights
information is defined as a set of metadata that supports the identifi-
cation of the rights status of a work. This includes (i) identification
14Here and below I use the term ”out of print” to define the situation where the
rightholder is not commercialising the work concerned in any form. So, this status
should be considered without reference to the ”print” form (if a work is available
online, it is ”in print” under this definition) and is defined at work level (if at least
one edition of the work is in print, than the work itself is in print).
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of the book concerned, (ii) identification of the work(s) included in
that book, (iii) identification of the commercial status of a work, (iv)
identification of the publisher, and (v) of contributors’15 name, and
finally (vi) the location of the rightholders. Since Arrow was born
at a time when orphan works were at the very heart of the political
agenda, the purpose of the project is often confused with the very
last element of the list above: the location of individual rightholders,
or the identification of orphan works when this location fails. This
is misleading.
Arrow is instead an open, standard-based system, which is con-
ceived to be used in any context, in order to manage rights informa-
tion. The main value is to provide interoperability among existing
resources and to foster the collection of additional data or enrich-
ment of existing data within a network. This complex system has
been named Rights Information Infrastructure (RII). Arrow is just
one project. There may be alternatives, at national or global level.
Any system that supports rights information management is what
I call here an RII.16 Though the concept of the RII was born within
the Arrow experience, I use this term here in a more general sense.
15The term ”contributor”, typical of the bibliographic metadata jargon, includes
here any creator that may have rights in the work: authors, translators, illustrators
etc.
16The RII does not coincide with the so called ”copyright management systems
(CMS), [which] are basically databases that contain information about content (works,
discrete manifestations of works and related products) and, in most cases, the author
and other rightsholders. That information is needed to support the process of autho-
rizing the use of those works by others. A CMS thus usually involves two basic modules,
one for the identification of content and rightsholders, the other for licensing” (Gervais and
Maurushat , emphasis added) . Here I propose to separate the two modules: rights
information management is seen as independent from rights management, though
the two modules can be managed by the same organisation. There may be cases,
however, where the two functions are managed by different entities. Furthermore,
the use of the term ”infrastructure” rather than ”system” is meant to suggest that the
information infrastructure should be neutral and accessible by any interested party.
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The announced BRR (Book Right Registry), provided for by the
Google Settlement Agreement, falls into this category. If and when
the Settlement is approved, the BRR is conceived to manage rights
information for the purpose of a large-scale digitisation programme,
and has been conceived by the US rightholders associations to serve
also alternative initiatives; therefore it is an RII in the sense referred
to in this paper.
Methodological Approach
The arguments and conclusions of this paper are based on an
economic approach and do not pretend to be precise from a legal
viewpoint. The analysis focuses on a limited target: the application of
the VSA model to deal with rights in digital library programmes targeted
at books. Therefore, it is limited to ”text based monographs”, without
reference to other content (music, images, audiovisual material etc.)
or to periodicals. The analysis also makes the following assump-
tions: First assumption: Rightholders associations and CMOs tend to
minimise the number of members who opt out. According to this
model, those organisations determine the scope of the license not on
the basis of ”average terms” acceptable by their members, but con-
sidering conditions that are acceptable to the vast majority of their
members, with particular attention paid to the rightholders’ motiva-
tion to exploit the work directly. Second assumption: rightholders in
the book sector tend to prefer direct management of rights for uses
that they consider to be ”primary exploitation” of their works. As a
consequence of this assumption, I define ”primary exploitation right”
any right that rightholders prefer to manage directly, and ”secondary
exploitation right” any right that rightholders are ready to mandate
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a CMO to manage.17 So, when I say that VSA are applicable to
secondary exploitation rights, this is simply an application of this
definition and does not intend to propose any additional limitation
of the scope of a VSA.
VSA and Digital Libraries
When looking at the book sector, the scope of collective man-
agement varies dramatically between print and digital publishing.
Traditionally, secondary exploitation mandated to CMOs is defined
according to the authorised uses – for example: ”photocopying part
of a book for teaching purposes” – and it applies to every book in
the CMO repertoire. I believe that for digital libraries (and possibly
in the digital environment in general) we need to use a different
variable to distinguish between primary and secondary exploitation.
Typically, libraries ask for ”scanning and making available on the
Internet”, which is surely a primary exploitation in terms of uses,
and is expected to become the very primary method of exploitation
of works in the digital era. Therefore, when rightholders are actively
commercialising their works, following the stated assumptions, they
will never mandate a CMO to license full exploitation of their works,
and thus no VSA system can apply (being based on the consensus
of the vast majority of rightholders). However, a new type of dis-
tinction can apply. In particular, when rightholders are not actively
commercialising their works, they may be prepared to mandate col-
lective management for their works, if and when the out of print
status is correctly identified. The conclusion I propose is that future
17Though similar in the vocabulary, this classification is different than the tradi-
tional juridical distinction between ”primary” and ”secondary” rights. For example,
translation rights are ”secondary” in a traditional classification but are referred to
”primary exploitation” in the usual publishing practice.
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applications of VSA will be increasingly based on the distinction between
categories of books rather than categories of uses. Therefore, it is likely
that new agreements will define their scope in this way: ”Scanning
and full making available is authorised only for out of print scien-
tific and academic works, whose last edition was published before
1965” (or anything similar). Alternatives such as: ”All books are
authorised to be scanned and made available only in preview of very
limited parts, only in the domestic territory and with no printing or
downloading possibility” would seem less realistic.
The Role of a Rights Information
Infrastructure
If my conclusion is correct, a title by title search will be necessary
before the use in order to understand whether the license covers that
particular book or not. This is a significant change in the way ECLs
– as the most important VSA model in place – are usually seen. The
expectation is that, within this system, no prior search is necessary,
since the license also covers ”non-mandated” works. Because of
the difference in the context, however, in the emerging VSAs some
form of prior search becomes necessary. ECL systems have always
covered only one ”category of works” for which rightholders’ rep-
resentatives were able to provide a license, so that – for example
– an RRO (Reproduction Rights Organisations, the CMO for liter-
ary works) will never be able to license rights in recorded music.
However, users can easily distinguish a book from a music record,
so there is no need for any search. In the new context, the identi-
fication of works that fall within the scope of the license becomes
more difficult, and should be inevitably done on a title by title basis.
When looking at the actual implementation of the Arrow RII, the
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phases devoted to the first part of the search (work identification
and in-print status at work level) cover most of the workflow. When
those phases have been completed, the proper rightholder search is
conducted through querying existing data sources belonging to the
network. Possibly – depending on the decisions of the stakeholders
– further search is conducted outside the system, and the results
are stored in the existing data sources. The first phase of the search
is exactly what is needed for the management of any type of VSA
system, including an ECL with the characteristics envisaged here.
Essentially, an RII helps in determining whether every book belongs
to the defined category. For example, it may be necessary to:
• match the library metadata record describing the book with
records present in authoritative sources, in order to precisely
identify the manifestation concerned;
• precisely identify the work(s) concerned with the scanning of
a certain book and all the other manifestations containing the
same work;
• identify the publisher(s) and contributor(s) involved;
• determine whether that work (not the book) is still in com-
merce;
• determine the date of publication at work level (e.g. the publi-
cation dates of all the editions of the work, if required);
• determine the genre of the work (e.g. whether it is ”scientific”
or ”academic”, which eventually require precise definition and
a way to determine it at title level).
In large-scale digitisation programmes, these data are very expen-
sive to manage and subject to a high level of error, so that having
an instrument that reduces costs and increases accuracy can be
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very valuable. These functions may also be seen from the opposite
viewpoint. The existence of an RII allows stakeholders to negotiate
more sophisticated agreements, since it enables them to define cate-
gories of works of particular interest for libraries and/or for which
rightholders are prepared to license rights for a broader range of
uses and/or at lower fees. In other words, an RII allows the creation
of a smarter agreement within a VSA environment. Finally, an RII
can support CMOs in managing the agreement. A key issue in large-
scale digitisation projects is that a library asks for information about
works starting from a metadata record referred to a book (i.e. to a
particular edition of that work). There are three fields where an RII
provides value:
• a library record may fail to match the CMO metadata record
for the same book. In this case, it is perfectly possible that
the CMO erroneously considers a book to contain a ”non-
registered” work (therefore associated with ”non-mandating”
rightholders) and subsequently starts a procedure to search
for the rightholders for distribution purposes;
• whenever a scanned book is an edition of a work that has been
registered in the RRO repertoire database through another
edition, without metadata at a ”work” level, the work will not
be recognised and therefore will be wrongly processed;
• if the rightholder decides to withdraw any particular work
from the agreement, an incorrect recognition of the work
from the initial metadata record that he/she provides may
create problems in the relationship between the CMO and
rightholder, since he/she will not be happy to see that the
withdrawal was not honoured. At best, the lack of recogni-
tion of withdrawn works will result in unnecessary costs for
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libraries that scan and make available books for which, subse-
quently, the rightholder will request deletion.
National Repertoires, Foreign Rightholders
and the Added Value of RIIs
The extension of an agreement to foreign rightholders is contro-
versial. From my abstract definition of VSA, the agreement signed
can bind rightholders (including non-mandating rightholders) if,
and only if, they belong to the category that the organisation who
signed the agreement genuinely represents. For this reason, the mat-
ter is not the nationality of the rightholders concerned, but it is their
representation within the association(s) signing the deal. However,
in the current circumstances, nationality is a very relevant variable.
This is simply due to the fact that CMOs and rightholders’ associa-
tions are usually country-based organisations. The fact that ECLs
usually include foreign works does not contradict the principle as
far as the CMOs that sign the agreement have bilateral agreements
with equivalent organisations in a significant number of foreign
countries, so as to be representative of foreign rightholders (Riis and
Schovsbo). Recently the terminology in all Nordic countries laws (ex-
cept in Sweden, where the change is underway) has been changed
to better clarify the point. Nowadays, the representation should
be demonstrated in respect to ”substantial amount of righthold-
ers whose works are being used” and not, as it was in the past,
of ”national rightholders”.18 In more general terms, I would argue
that the ECL stops belonging to the category of agreements here
18The change from ”representation of national rightholders” to the broader con-
cept of representation of the works that are being used started in Denmark in 2001.
”Norway and Finland introduced a similar criterion in the implementation of the
Copyright Directive in 2005”(Koskinen-Olsson 292-293).
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described, as far as there is lack of representation of rightholders
that are bound by the agreement. Similarly, as long as the Google
Settlement pretended to bind rightholders that never were involved
in the determination of the deal, it was hard to describe it as a
genuine VSA. As said, things have been changed in the amended
version of the settlement.19 In the theoretical model, I expect that
emerging agreements will limit their scope to national rightholders,
thereby maintaining coherence between rightholders representation
and scope of the agreement. Therefore, it is realistic that agreements
will limit the scope to national works,20 which however can be de-
fined in different ways: books published in that country (or first
published in that country), or books with national authors, or with
at least one national author, and so on. Again, an RII system can
support the identification of these categories. In Arrow, this is done
through the integration with VIAF.21 In general, it requires the use
of authority files of publishers and authors. Furthermore, if the RII
has transnational coverage, when it receives a request from a library
in country A concerning a book published in country B, it will be
19Another interesting example is the debate concerning the application of the ECL
model in Canada. Gervais and Maurushat wrote: ”The extended collective licence is
an interesting model for countries like Canada where, on the one hand, rightholders
are reasonably well organized and informed, and, on the other hand, a great part
of the material that is the object of licences comes from foreign countries”(Gervais
and Maurushat 24). My position is that if ”a great part of the material that is the
object of the licences comes from foreign countries”, an agreement should be reached
with foreign CMOs, unless the ”reasonably well organised” Canadian CMO is explic-
itly mandated to represent also foreign rightholders. Nordic legislations, with the
changes, made this principle more explicit.
20By the way, this may correspond to the objectives of a national library, which
will usually tend to prioritise the digitisation of national cultural heritage, when
considering budget limitations.
21The VIAF (Virtual International Authority File - http://www.viaf.org) is an
initiative to made the authority files (i.e. the authoritative lists of authors’ names) of
a large number of National Library interoperable worldwide.
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able to forward the request to the representative CMO in country B.
Representation of rightholders can be established in several ways:
through bilateral agreements between CMOs; libraries may ask mul-
tiple CMOs to provide licenses; groups of CMOs can be involved in
a single negotiation in order to increase the number of represented
rightholders; or simply stakeholders may decide to limit the scope
of the agreement to their country. Again, an RII can enable any of
these solutions, thereby increasing the range of options available to
the negotiating parties.
Some Empirical Evidence
To sum up, the theoretical assumption is that concrete applica-
tions of VSA (including ECL) will probably be limited to certain
categories of works (and rightholders) and will on the other hand
be broad in terms of authorised uses. The opposite choice (limiting
uses and broadening categories of works) would be less probable,
though still possible. An agreement that neither limits its scope
(significantly) in terms of uses nor in the affected categories of books
is not consistent with my approach. Is this happening in reality?
The first empirical evidence I would like to consider comes from
Norway and seems to contradict the first statement. The agreement
signed for the Bokhylla.no project22 is limited in terms of authorised
uses but not in respect to categories of works. As for the first as-
pect, scanned books are accessible only from Norway, and only for
reading on screen without downloading or printing. On the other
hand, the only limitation in terms of categories of books is related
to the date of publication: only books published in certain decades
22See http://www.nb.no/bokhylla. A description of the project, including a chap-
ter describing the copyright management issues is in Skarstein (“Strategies for a
Digital National Library”).
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fall within the scope of the agreement. However, I argue that the
selection of these dates is done more for experimentation purposes
than as a definitive decision, so I would consider the case of the
Bokhylla programme as a pilot of the model with restrictions con-
cerning uses but applicable to all books. This model does not enjoy
significant value from an RII, since de facto it does not require any
prior search, though some value may lie in the post management of
the agreement. I personally doubt that the effects of such an agree-
ment would be very valuable for both libraries and rightholders. It
is probable, in fact, that for certain categories of books rightholders
would be prepared to provide much broader licenses, even for free,
since they are not interested anymore in commercially exploiting
these works.
A consequent forecast is that, in similar cases, libraries will look
for additional agreements, either contacting rightholders individ-
ually or through a new ECL agreement. The first case would be
paradoxical, since starting from an ECL model, users will be then
obliged to use title by title licenses, renouncing both to the advantage
of having collective management and to the advantage of having an
extension of the agreement.
Moving to Denmark, the discussion seems to start on a different
basis, confirming the forecasts provided by the theory. In this case,
there has been just an initial discussion between stakeholders. One
hypothesis on the table is to limit the agreement to scientific and
academic works, published before a cut-off date and currently out
of print. At that point, the library receiving the license will be
authorised to make the digitised works available on the Internet
without limitations, for non commercial uses.
These two cases are based on ECL models. It is worth analysing
three other cases in different legal frameworks, to see similarities and
differences: the Google Settlement, the German agreement between
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rightholders and the national library, and the discussion in France
between the Ministry of Culture and rightholders representatives.
In the Google Settlement it is noteworthy that the solution was to
discriminate between in print and out of print books. The uses
regulated in the agreement are very broad, and include commercial
uses, which are even more sensitive than those usually foreseen in
agreements made with libraries. The model required the creation
of the BRR to manage the identification of a book as in print / out
of print as well as the date of publication, and, in application of
the new Settlement, the country of publication. Moreover, it has to
manage claiming of rights, including rightholders’ withdrawal of
their works and to manage subsequent revenue distribution. This
confirms that models based on the definition of the scope of an
agreement on the basis of categories of books require an RII. The
functions of the BRR emerge very clearly: (i) determining whether
a book falls under the category included in the agreement scope;
(ii) managing the relationship with the rightholders, including to
guarantee that every rightholder receives the correct information,
has full capacity to claim his/her right and to opt out, if he/she
desires so, and receives due payment at the end of the process.
Before the agreement enters into force, the BRR does not exist. The
same functions are managed by a notification office using a database
and a claiming service provided by Google itself. For both tasks,
the experience of the Google settlement databases has demonstrated
very clearly how complex they are. Initially, the determination of
the commercial availability status was systematically wrong even
when the system was using the correct data sources (Associazione
Italiana Editori).
In Germany, the above mentioned solution (see p. 242) is very
similar to that described for the Danish case: the agreement will
be limited to works that are (i) out of print, (ii) published before
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a cut-off date. It is planned to have a system in place to allow
rightholders to withdraw their works at any time.23 Again: there
is a precise limitation of scope in terms of work categories, but not
of authorised uses, which will be very broad: full display on the
Internet world-wide, though for non commercial uses only. Another
element of the agreement is the limitation of its validity to German
works (i.e. first published in Germany), which is due precisely to the
fact that rightholders’ associations are able to speak only on behalf of
their own members, and membership is based on national territories
(probably it is also due to the fact that German libraries prefer to
use German tax-payers’ money to digitise and make available the
national cultural heritage). Also in this case, I envisage that an RII
is needed to support the management of the agreement, and may
help in the definition of the agreement itself, since it may enable
a more sophisticated selection of books, and thus could decrease
the risk of competition between the publications made available by
the authorised library and normal exploitation of the works by the
rightholders.
In France the Ministry of Culture and the publishers representa-
tives are currently considering an agreement on out-of-print works
from the 20th century. The project proposed by the Ministry would
be based on four fundamental principles: (i) the digitisation of all the
collections by the French national library at the expense of the State;
(ii) an overall agreement on a massive set of works, going beyond the
negotiation on a title by title basis, but with flexible mechanisms for
opt-in and opt-out; (iii) a secure agreement legally binding the three
parties (the Ministry, publishers and authors); (iv) a model of dissem-
ination and commercial exploitation of works with mechanisms for
23The broad similarity of the planned Danish and German solutions confirms, in my
view, that the VSA concept has some value in the analysis. ECL is just one category
of VSA, and may be very similar to other agreement implemented in different legal
systems.
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income distribution to be defined. Also in this case, the discussion
is still at early stages. However, it is interesting that somehow the
general scheme is replicated, though the legal technique to imple-
ment the agreement – if and when it is reached – would likely be
different, following the French legal tradition, so that a compulsory
collective management has been envisaged. Terms of the agreement
are expected to be largely left to stakeholders negotiation, so also
this case will probably falls in the VSA definition.
Conclusions
Rights management within large scale digitisation plans of li-
brary collections suffers from the well known phenomenon of high
transaction costs. The traditional solution of collective management
is still an effective way to approach the problem, but requires re-
shaping in comparison to the past. My proposal is to go back to the
principles that characterised the collective management of rights,
and abandon the individual elements of previous solutions, which
instead can be misleading. In my view, in a changing world, models
for managing rights based on stakeholders consensus, like the VSAs,
are preferable, because (i) they are more flexible and thus easier to
change when the context changes, and (ii) any top-down solution,
like an ad hoc copyright exception, is very difficult to define in such
a challenging field. The difficulty comes from a peculiar feature of
collective management of rights in this context. Digital libraries re-
quire licenses for very primary exploitation of the works, including
making the content available online. Being aware of this, the defini-
tion of the scope of any agreement is very delicate, and can not be
done without direct involvement of stakeholders concerned. Recent
experiences show that when stakeholders started a negotiation with
open mind, they have found solutions, most of the times based on
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the distinction between categories of books, and in particular on
the distinction between in print and out of print works. It is worth
recalling the nature of the transaction cost problem implied in a
large scale digitisation programme. Significant costs are related to
”search”: there may be little incentive for buyers and sellers to look
for each other to finalise a deal, when this deal has little financial
value for both of them. There may be many mechanisms making
such a situation undesirable. Varian (“Copyright term extension
and orphan works”) provides a comprehensive analysis of the prob-
lem and proposes a simple formalisation that helps very much in
understanding the points I discuss here. When a work is still ac-
tively commercialised, the transaction cost issue simply does not
exist for a primary use such as full making available online. The
value of the deal fully justifies dedicating some efforts in searching
and negotiating. Furthermore, search costs are very small, since
publishers actively promote the book, and there are very good in-
formation resources (primary the ”books in print” databases) that
allow to reach the relevant information. Instead, the issue arises
when considering out of print works, for which the ratio between
the cost of the search and the value of the individual deal may be
too high, and sometimes >1. However, there is a cost also in the
identification of the commercial status of a work. All VSAs licensing
full making available on the Internet, which have been signed or
are under discussion (or, according to my analysis, will be agreed
in the future) require this identification and thus imply the related
cost. This has two consequences. First, the creation of systems that
facilitate rights information management is a prerequisite for the so-
lution of the transaction cost problem. Decreasing costs in this phase
enables stakeholders to identify the best solutions for them, since it
removes constrains and thus increases the degrees of freedom in the
negotiation. Second, prior search for rightholders should be seen as
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an additional feature to the search for the commercial status of the
work. Any assessment of costs related to rightholders search should
take into account this nature. If we consider that any realistic VSA
requires the identification of the commercial status at work level, it
is important to identify the additional cost of a specific VSA including
some rightholders search as a separate estimate in order to decide if a
rightholders search is – in a specific context – desirable. Righthold-
ers searches also have benefits. Some are intangible (a stronger
respect of authors’ moral rights is the most important), some are
tangible, and thus measurable. The most relevant is the extra-cost
implied in a process where libraries first scan a book and make it
available and later are obliged to delete it when the rightholder asks
for withdrawal.
The main conclusion of my analysis is that we need to aban-
don some obsolete trade-offs that have characterised the discussion
around this subject up to now. The first is whether there should, or
should not be a title by title search prior to the inclusion of a book in a
digitisation programme. The analysis shows that some prior search is
simply inevitable as far as commercially availability of the work is
concerned. The only realistic alternative24 is to dramatically reduce
the licensed uses, like in the Norwegian experience. Any plan for
making the cultural heritage fully available online requires some
form of a title by title search. The second trade-off is whether there
should, or should not be a title by title search for rightholders, once the
work has been identified as non commercially available. If a license
24I do not consider realistic the other alternative that is possible in theory: a so broad
exception that allows digitisation and full making available online also commercially
available works. A jurist would probably say that such an exception violates the
three steps test, since it would be in competition with the normal exploitation of the
work by the rightholder. In my language, this violation is simply a consequence
of the fact that imagining a system that does not require prior authorisation for a
primary exploitation of a work that rightholders is actively commercialising simply
undermines the economic rationale of copyright.
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is implied, and thus there are revenues to be distributed, a search
is anyway necessary later for distribution purposes. Therefore, the
point is not if the search should be conducted, but when. Mak-
ing some prior search seems to be convenient for both users and
rightholders, in particular if there is an opt-out mechanism in place,
like in the described VSA model. As said, there is a cost associated
to the case that a library scans and makes available a book that then
it is requested to delete. Anticipating the search allows to save such
cost. Furthermore, if an RII is in place that allows querying in an
effective way existing resources that are able to provide informa-
tion about rightholders, it is surely worth to use this opportunity.
Considering these elements, I argue that some rightholders search is
cost-effective. My suggestion is to switch the discussion from ”if ” to
”how”. How long, how extensively, investing how many resources
the search should be conducted. There is not a single solution fit-
ting all cases, since the advantage of prior search depends on actual
circumstances in a certain moment and in a certain context. In the
ideal world, if an RII exists that is able to provide perfect search
results instantaneously, prior and ex post search are equivalent. But
in the ideal world, by definition, transaction costs do not exist, so
this ”utopian RII” is not the answer to the problem. We don’t live in
the ideal world and thus stakeholders should consider the quality
of the existing information resources to set agreement terms that
balance effectiveness in dealing with transaction costs and respect
for copyright, including moral rights. This is a further argument that
makes stakeholders involvement and voluntary agreements prefer-
able to any top-down solution to the problem. From the top, it is
very difficult to see the complexity of such a changing environment
where the terms of any agreement should be decided.
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